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State v. Harte, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 82 (Oct. 30, 2008)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – HABEAS CORPUS/AGGRAVATING 
CIRCUMSTANCE IN SENTENCING 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from a district court order partially granting a post-conviction petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed the district court order vacating Defendant’s death sentence, affirming 
the guilty verdict and ordering a new penalty hearing. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In October 1997, Shawn Russell Harte and two codefendants, Latisha Babb and 
Weston Sirex, murdered a Reno cab driver, John Castro, during the course of a robbery.  
Harte subsequently admitted to sheriff’s deputies that he shot Castro in the head. 
 Harte, Babb and Sirex were indicted and the jury found them guilty of first-degree 
murder with the use of a deadly weapon and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon.  
The jury was not, however, asked to return a special verdict form indicating whether they 
convicted based on the State’s willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder theory or the 
State’s alternative theory of felony murder. 
Harte was sentenced to death.2  The jury found only one aggravating 
circumstance: the murder was committed during the course of a robbery.  The jury found 
this alone outweighed any mitigating factors.  Harte unsuccessfully appealed his 
conviction3 and was denied in his initial request for post-conviction relief.4  Harte filed a 
subsequent post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  Harte alleged that 
because the sole aggravating circumstance found by the jury was the same robbery used 
to support the felony murder theory, the aggravator was invalid pursuant to McConnell v. 
State.5  As such, Harte argued he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. 
The State acknowledged McConnell and Bejarano v. State6 may afford Harte 
relief but argued that the appropriate remedy was a new trial.  Harte subsequently 
abandoned all claims that could result in a new trial and indicated that his focus was 
                                                 
1 By Ian Houston 
2 Babb and Sirex were sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. 
3 Harte v. State, 116 Nev. 1054, 13 P.3d 420 (2000). 
4 Order Dismissing Appeal, Harte v. State, No. 43877 (April 7, 2005); Order Denying Rehearing, Harte v. 
State, No. 43877 (May 19, 2005); Order Denying En Banc Reconsideration, Harte v. State, No. 43877 
(Sept. 8, 2005). 
5 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004) (holding that it is unconstitutional to base aggravating circumstance 
in capital prosecution on felony that was used to obtain first-degree murder conviction), reh’g denied, 121 
Nev. 25, 107 P.3d 1287 (2005); Harte also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. 
6 122 Nev. 1066, 146 P.3d 265 (2006) (holding that McConnell applies retroactively). 
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solely on obtaining a new penalty hearing.  The district court invalidated the sole 
aggravator and agreed with Harte that the appropriate remedy for a McConnell error was 
a new penalty hearing.  The district court vacated the death sentence, affirmed the guilty 
verdict and stayed further proceedings pending this appeal.                    
Justice Maupin, with Chief Justice Gibbons and Justices Douglas and Cherry 
concurring (Justices Hardesty, Parraguirre and Saitta concurring in the judgment) 
affirmed the district court’s finding of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment.  The court 
held the district court did not err in invalidating the sole aggravator in this case pursuant 
to McConnell and that the appropriate remedy in a McConnell error case where the sole 
aggravating circumstance is invalidated is a new penalty hearing and not a new trial.   
 
Discussion 
 
McConnell was Properly Decided 
 
 The State argued that McConnell was wrongly decided and “three major flaws” in 
the decision called for its reversal:   
First, the McConnell analysis begins with the definition of first-degree murder 
instead of a “generic offense of felonious homicide,” the common-law definition of 
murder, or even the notion of felonious murder.  According to the State, this prevented 
the court from recognizing that the Nevada statutory scheme genuinely narrows the class 
of individuals that are eligible for the death penalty.  The court in this case was not 
convinced by this argument.  The McConnell court relied on the analytical framework of 
Lowenfield v. Phelps in determining that the narrowing function may be accomplished by 
narrowly drawn definitions of capital offenses or through aggravating circumstances 
found by a jury at the penalty phase.7  The McConnell court evaluated Nevada’s capital 
sentencing scheme as it applies to felony murder and found capital felony murder to be 
defined broadly and the felony aggravating circumstances of NRS 200.033(4) insufficient 
to genuinely narrow the class of felony murderers eligible for the death penalty.  The 
State did not convince the court in this case that the McConnell analysis was flawed 
based on its starting definition. 
Second, the McConnell analysis is based on the question of whether the statutory 
aggravating circumstances “sufficiently” exclude an adequate number of murderers from 
the death penalty.  The State argued that the analysis should be an objective test of 
whether the aggravators “genuinely” narrow the class eligible for a death sentence as put 
forth in Lowenfield.  The court, however, points out that the McConnell court’s analysis 
began by discussing whether either of the two aggravators in that case “genuinely” 
narrowed the class. 8   The analysis showed that while the two aggravators may 
“theoretically” narrow the class, they did not satisfy constitutional demands because they 
failed to “genuinely” narrow.9  As such, the court concluded that McConnell used the 
proper standard. 
                                                 
7 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988). 
8 McConnell, 120 Nev. at 1067, 102 P.3d at 623. 
9 Id. at 1069, 102 P.3d at 624. 
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Third, the McConnell analysis discounted the requirement that the felony 
aggravating circumstance must be accompanied by certain mental states.10  The State 
argues this intent element in Nevada’s statutory scheme objectively narrows the class 
eligible for the death penalty.  The court, however, was not persuaded that the McConnell 
analysis of the felony aggravating circumstance intent element was inadequate.  The 
McConnell court noted that the felony aggravating circumstance intent element (1) was 
different than the intent required for a felony-murder conviction, (2) largely mirrored the 
constitutional standard and did little to narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty, (3) lacked the specificity of the capital felony-murder definition that met the 
constitutional narrowing requirement of Lowenfield, and (4) could be overlooked and not 
considered by the jury.11  The court further considered the issue on rehearing and found 
that while the felony aggravating circumstance intent element is narrower than Nevada’s 
felony murder, it is still quite arguable that Nevada’s felony murder aggravator, standing 
alone as a basis for seeking the death penalty, fails to genuinely narrow the class of death 
eligible felony murderers.12   
As such the court held that McConnell was correctly decided and the district 
court’s order relying on McConnell was proper.            
 
A New Penalty Hearing is the Remedy under the Circumstances of this Case 
  
 The State argued the McConnell error was a charging error and was willing to 
amend the charging document to remove the felony murder theory making a new trial the 
appropriate remedy.   
 The court held that a McConnell error is not a charging error because the State is 
permitted at its discretion to proceed on alternate theories supported by evidence.13  
Instead, the McConnell violation resulted in a sentencing error.  The State offered no 
relevant authority or cogent bases to refute the district court’s conclusion that a new 
penalty hearing is the only remedy when a prejudicial McConnell error invalidates the 
sole aggravator.14   
  
Concurrence 
 
HARDESTY, J., with whom PARRAGUIRRE and SAITTA, JJ., agree, concurring: 
 
 Justice Hardesty concurs that a new penalty hearing is the proper remedy when 
the only aggravating circumstance found by the jury is invalidated pursuant to McConnell 
but believes this case reveals three fundamental flaws in McConnell’s analytical 
framework: 
                                                 
10 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.033(4). 
11 McConnell, 120 Nev. at 1067-68, 102 P.3d at 623-24.  
12 McConnell v. State, 121 Nev. 25, 28, 107 P.3d 1287, 1289 (2005). 
13 Walker v. State, 116 Nev. 670, 673, 6 P.3d 477, 479 (2000). 
14 The remedy is a new penalty hearing unless it is “clear beyond a reasonable doubt that absent the invalid 
aggravator[ ] the jury still would have imposed a sentence of death.”  Bejarano, 122 Nev. at 1081, 146 P.3d 
at 275-76.  
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 First, the Legislature has adopted a statutory scheme to narrow the class of 
persons eligible for the death penalty that does not necessitate judicial expansion.15  
Second, the Legislature has narrowly defined felony murder by limiting the felonies that 
subject a defendant to a first-degree murder conviction.16  Third, there is no 
constitutional, legislative, or jurisprudential basis to impose a specific intent to kill 
requirement for any aggravating circumstance. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court found that McConnell was correctly decided and that a new penalty 
hearing is the proper remedy where the sole aggravating circumstance is invalidated.  The 
district court did not err in its application of McConnell or by invalidating the sole 
aggravator, that “the murder was committed during the course of a robbery,” because it 
was improperly based on the felony used to obtain the first-degree murder conviction.  
The court therefore affirmed the district court’s order vacating Harte’s death sentence, 
affirming the guilty verdict and ordering a new penalty hearing.    
                                                 
15 See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 200.030(1), 200.033. 
16 It is not a broad felony murder definition as it involves crimes that are inherently dangerous but some 
inherently dangerous felonies are excluded. 
